The Artemis Accords: What Signing On Really Means for States and the Aerospace and Defense Industry
On June 25, 2026, Botswana became the 68th State signatory to the Artemis Accords (the Accords),[1] following shortly after Latvia, Jordan, Morocco, Malta, Paraguay and Ireland – the latter’s accession bringing all European Space Agency (ESA) members within the framework. This widespread adoption reflects growing international consensus around the responsible exploration and use of outer space, with implications for both regulatory and commercial practices. At the same time, renewed momentum behind the Artemis program – including the success of the recent Artemis II mission and NASA’s decision to discontinue a key component of the program, the Lunar Gateway project – has brought increased attention to the broader legal and policy implications of international participation in lunar exploration.
What are the Artemis Accords?
The Accords stem from the US-led Artemis program, an initiative aimed at returning “man” to the Moon and at advancing civil space exploration more broadly.[2] The Artemis program consists of a sequenced set of five missions – beginning with uncrewed and followed by crewed lunar missions – envisaged as stepping stones toward a sustained human presence on the Moon and future deep‑space exploration. The Artemis program has, however, recently undergone substantial changes. Most notably, NASA has abandoned plans to develop the Lunar Gateway, a lunar-orbiting station that was originally envisaged as a key component of the Artemis architecture and a major focus of international cooperation. NASA has instead shifted its focus towards the development of lunar surface infrastructure intended to support a sustained human presence on the Moon.
Legally, the Accords constitute non-binding political commitments, concluded on a bilateral basis between the United States (acting through NASA and the U.S. Department of State) and each participating State. The uniformity of the text means that, in practice, the Accords function as a shared normative framework for civil space activities between the signatory States.
First launched in October 2020, the Accords articulate a set of practical principles intended to reinforce and operationalize the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Although legally binding, the treaty’s core obligations – such as the prohibition on national appropriation of outer space, as well as the principles of peaceful exploration, scientific cooperation and transparency – have remained largely abstract and difficult to apply in practice. By translating them into more concrete operational norms (e.g., defined safety zones and mandatory open scientific data sharing requirements), the Accords enhance regulatory predictability for private actors seeking to engage in space activities.
New market and investment opportunities
Accession to the Accords signals a State’s alignment with the governing principles of the U.S.-led Artemis program, facilitating subsequent signing of bilateral agreements with NASA through which specific mission roles and contributions can be secured for commercial parties.
Since signing the Accords, a number of States have contributed to, or secured roles in, specific Artemis missions – including the Lunar Gateway program before its cancellation – thus scaling up their domestic space industries.
- Japan: Japan was a key contributor to the Lunar Gateway. As such, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) has engaged Japanese companies to deliver key components of the Gateway’s International Habitation module (I-Hab), which was supposed to provide life-support functions enabling crews to work, live and conduct research in lunar orbit.[3]
- Canada: The Canadian government has invested CAD 999.8m in Canadian company MDA Space to develop a next‑generation robotic arm for the Lunar Gateway. This project involved hundreds of Canadian SMEs and research organizations across the country.[4]
- Australia: Australia has partnered with NASA to develop an Australian-built rover meant to collect lunar data for scientific research, which NASA will carry to the Moon.[5]
- ESA: The ESA is one of NASA’s principal partners on Artemis, who contributed several mission-critical elements of the Lunar Gateway. These included the European Service Module, which was supposed to provide propulsion, power, and life‑support capabilities for the Orion Spacecraft used in all crewed missions to space, and ESPRIT, which was supposed to deliver refueling capabilities and lunar communications infrastructure.
- Italy: The Italian Space Agency has contracted Thales Alenia Space Italy to undertake the preliminary design of the Multi-Purpose Habitation (MPH) lunar surface model – a pressurized habitat intended to operate for up to a decade on the Moon, and which NASA plans to launch in 2033.[6]
The Accords thus lead to increased collaboration between NASA and the private sectors of signatory States, helping accelerate technological advances and stimulating domestic employment and industrial growth. Structured through NASA’s commercial contracting model, these activities also contribute to the emergence of a more harmonized contractual and operational framework for public-private cooperation in space.
Risks and opportunities
The cancellation of the Lunar Gateway program illustrates both the complexity and the resilience of large-scale international space projects. Governments, space agencies and private contractors have already developed significant technological capabilities and infrastructure throughout the program and NASA’s administrator, Jared Isaacman, stated that many of these systems would be repurposed for future missions. At the same time, the precise path forward remains under discussion for many stakeholders. As of June 23, 2026, the ESA confirmed it will continue to develop planned hardware for Lunar Gateway while awaiting results of studies for how best to repurpose each intended project. The plans for other international partners, such as Canada, remain unannounced.
This policy change underscores the risks and opportunities inherent in such large-scale projects, which are often politically precarious. In this context, a clear dispute resolution framework is paramount to enable space actors to assess their options and potential liability.
The Accords themselves are not binding and, as such, do not provide a basis for the settlement of disputes. That said, we expect that additional international instruments including binding obligations will emerge as States continue to build on the principles set out in the Accords. This is a rapidly evolving area of space governance, and developments will warrant close and ongoing monitoring.
In the meantime, as private actors assume an increasingly prominent role in space exploration (as illustrated above), space-related disputes – and the associated legal and regulatory risks – are likely to increase, including in the following areas:
- disputes arising from the cancellation, suspension or restructuring of major space programs, including claims relating to terminated contracts, cost overruns and the repurposing of infrastructure;
- the commercial supply of satellite services to telecommunications and defense customers;
- contract performance and liability claims relating to launch services, refueling operations, and in-orbit servicing arrangements;
- joint venture and shareholder disputes between State-owned enterprises and/or private-sector operators; and
- insurance coverage and claims disputes, particularly in connection with orbital damage and collision events.
Companies negotiating launch, procurement, manufacturing or lunar‑surface contracts should therefore pay particular attention to the careful drafting of arbitration clauses, the selection of governing law, and the allocation of liability – particularly where supply chains span multiple jurisdictions and involve a mix of public and private actors.
As capital continues to flow into the space sector, States’ exposure under investment treaties is likely to follow. States will increasingly be required to strike a careful balance between the promotion and protection of private-sector investment on the one hand, and complying with their domestic and international obligations, on the other. The Devas arbitrations against India illustrate how reallocating spectrum to serve public sector priorities can expose States to investment treaty liability where private satellite agreements are terminated. Although investor-State arbitration in the space sector remains in its infancy, the trajectory points toward the emergence of increasingly complex, multi-jurisdictional disputes engaging core principles of international law.
With a thorough understanding of these complex issues, our international arbitration team helps clients anticipate and resolve disputes affecting the space industry. Please contact us to learn more.
