Long anticipated whistleblower incentive reforms subject to consultation
The UK Government has published a consultation on proposals for the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) to introduce a scheme to reward whistleblowers. The framework is part of a wider package of proposed reforms of whistleblowing protections for workers under the Employment Rights Act 1996 (see our blog on those reforms here). In this blog, we look at the main proposals for the scheme, some insights from home and abroad, its practical application and next steps.
The proposals
The proposals build on the recommendations of Jonathan Fisher KC in Part Two of his Independent Review of Disclosure and Fraud Offences, published in July 2026. The consultation forms part of the Government’s response and includes a strong statement of support by the Government for incentivising whistleblowers.
The Government’s proposals (on which they are seeking views) are as follows:
to reward whistleblowers who provide information that is 'significant and original' and that leads to a successful enforcement outcome against a company, such as a conviction or a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA);
eligibility for a reward to depend on several factors linked to the scheme’s objectives, including whether the individual: (i) had a legal duty to report; (ii) was culpable in the offending; (iii) has a serious criminal conviction; and (iv) is an authorised Covert Human Intelligence Source and/or obtained the information through dishonest or illegal means;
rewards to be paid from the company's financial penalty and to be paid only once the case, and any appeals, have run their course. Payments in DPA cases could therefore be delayed until the company has settled its penalty in full;
the level of reward to be calculated as a percentage of the penalty within a set range, with the amount depending on factors such as the value of the information, the whistleblower's level of cooperation, the promptness of reporting, any complicity in the wrongdoing and how significant the whistleblower’s information was compared with other evidence in the case; and
where several individuals provide information that contributes to the outcome, the reward could be shared between them.
In addition, the Government is consulting on various other aspects of the scheme without proposing its preferred approach, including the size of rewards, the hearing of appeals and complaints in relation to the scheme and whether the SFO should report annually on outcomes. As recommended by Jonathan Fisher KC, the consultation also seeks views on whether new criminal offences should be introduced for: (i) knowingly making false reports under the scheme; and (ii) harassing or intimidating whistleblowers who report information under the scheme.
Insights from home and abroad
Some insights into how whistleblower incentivisation schemes operate in practice, as well as the potential advantages and pitfalls of them, can be gleaned from existing models at home and abroad.
In the UK, HMRC's recently launched Strengthened Reward Scheme allows an individual whose information leads to the collection of at least £1.5 million in tax to receive up to 30% of the tax collected (excluding penalties and interest). Payments remain discretionary, but there is no cap within that 30% limit. The Competition and Markets Authority also already offers rewards of up to £250,000 for reporting cartel activity. To date, there is limited information available on how successful these schemes have been in practice.
On the international stage, the US remains the leader in using whistleblower incentives to tackle financial crime. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the power to pay whistleblowers between 10% and 30% of fines over $1m where the whistleblower voluntarily provides original, credible information that leads to a successful SEC enforcement action. Since the scheme’s inception in 2011, the SEC has paid more than $2.2bn to 444 whistleblowers up to late 2024, including a record reward to one whistleblower of almost $279m in 2023.
Following the reported success of the SEC scheme, other US agencies have followed suit. In particular, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) three-year Corporate Whistleblower Rewards Pilot Program, launched in August 2024 and expanded in May 2025 to cover sanctions, trade and procurement fraud among other areas, offers whistleblowers up to 30% of the first $100m forfeited (see our previous blog here). In addition, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division launched its own programme in July 2025 and made its first reward of $1m in January 2026 (see our blog here). Most recently, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network proposed rules that would go further still, making rewards to whistleblowers of between 10% and 30% mandatory and disqualifying only those convicted of a crime, rather than anyone involved in the wrongdoing (see our blog here).
As can be seen from the programmes highlighted above, rewards of between 10% and 30% of funds recovered is a common feature of many other incentivisation frameworks and may therefore provide a starting point for an appropriate range for the SFO’s programme. The expansion of these programmes, both in the UK and US, once established by one agency, may also mean that other agencies in the UK could consider introducing similar schemes if the SFO scheme proves to be a success.
Clearly, the benefit to prosecutors from the schemes is that they provide a new route to obtaining critical evidence. Analysis of schemes in the US, Canada and other countries suggest that they increase the quantity and quality of reporting of corporate misconduct, such as fraud, bribery and money laundering (see RUSI report here).
However, there are potential pitfalls too:
Whistleblowers may delay reporting in the hope that their reward grows, although US agencies counter this by taking into account how promptly a report was made, a feature that the proposed UK scheme also includes.
The figures relating to the SEC scheme also demonstrate that considerable resources are likely to be required to sift large volumes of reports (many of which may not be credible or result in a successful enforcement outcome). For example, Jonathan Fisher KC’s review notes that fewer than 1% of whistleblowers under some US programmes have received a reward. In FY2025, for example, the SEC received around 27,000 whistleblower tips but only paid rewards to 48 whistleblowers. The SFO, which handled 167 qualifying whistleblowing disclosures in 2024/25, will inevitably face a significant increase in reports if a scheme is introduced, which raises questions about appropriate resourcing.
The proposal that a whistleblower will only receive an incentive following a successful outcome could mean that reporters face a long wait for any reward and potentially no reward at all if the SFO is not able to achieve an outcome. As Jonathan Fisher KC notes, SFO investigations have recently taken around 4.3 years on average, and many do not lead to a successful enforcement outcome. This may test how attractive any potential scheme proves to be in practice.
It also will be important for enforcement agencies to offer whistleblowers adequate protection and support, particularly in light of allegations of poor treatment of whistleblowers by other regulators. For example, an All-Party Parliamentary Group has recently called for an independent investigation into the Financial Conduct Authority’s handling of whistleblowers following public criticism.
What this means for corporates
If a scheme were to be introduced in due course, the prospect of employees being rewarded for reporting misconduct externally may affect internal corporate whistleblowing processes and require companies to carefully consider how they support whistleblowers, investigate concerns fairly and promptly, and self-report wrongdoing early where necessary. In this regard, it remains to be seen how the Government proposals will deal with the interplay between corporate cooperation and whistleblower incentivisation. Nevertheless, although the introduction of any scheme is some way off, now may be a good time for corporates to start to consider their whistleblowing arrangements, including relevant policies, procedures and speak-up channels, and the wider culture around them.
What’s next?
The proposals, if implemented, will be an important intelligence tool for the SFO, to complement the raft of new substantive powers in their arsenal and their stated desire to generate more cases for themselves.
The consultation is open until 8 January 2027, and the Government expects to publish its response later that year, when more of the detail should begin to take shape. Whatever form that takes, the direction of travel is clear. After years of debate, the UK is moving closer to joining the growing list of jurisdictions that financially reward whistleblowers who report on economic crime. Those with views on how the scheme should work, including how it should interact with corporate self-reporting, can respond to the consultation until the January 2027 deadline.
