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  4. SEC Proposed Rule On Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Could Expand Retail Access to Private Capital
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SEC Proposed Rule On Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Could Expand Retail Access to Private Capital

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Nov 17 2026

Introduction

On September 30, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued two rule proposals as part of its ongoing efforts to increase retail investors’ access to private markets and alternative investments. The first proposal, Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization (“Proposed Rule”), would expand the circumstances when SEC-registered investment advisers (“RIAs”) could charge performance fees to clients, subject to certain conditions. The second proposal, which is discussed in a separate post, would modernize interval fund rules and expand the ability of closed-end funds that are registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”) and business development companies (“BDCs”) to issue multiple classes of their common shares.

If the Proposed Rule is adopted, it could expand retail access to private capital.  However, the Proposed Rule would also require RIAs, sponsors, and funds to implement policies and practices to facilitate compliance and increase the responsibilities of regulated funds’ boards of directors.  

Specifically, the Proposed Rule would

  • Increase the ability of RIAs to charge performance fees to registered funds if certain conditions are met, eliminating the need of RIAs to “look-through” the registered fund to confirm that all of its investors are qualified clients in order to charge a performance fee;
  • Allow private funds relying on the exclusion from the definition of “investment company” in Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act (“3(c)(1) funds”) and separately-managed accounts (“SMAs”) to pay performance fees if the fund investors or account holder, respectively, meet the “accredited investor” threshold rather than meeting the higher financial thresholds that currently exist for natural persons to be deemed qualified clients. This would expand the universe of natural persons who are able to invest in 3(c)(1) funds that pay performance fees, because the accredited investor thresholds for natural persons are lower than the existing qualified client threshold.  (Compare the accredited investor thresholds (income in each of the last two years, and expected income for the current year, of $200,000 (or $300,000 with a spouse); $1 million in net worth) with the qualified client threshold ($1.4 million assets under management or $2.7 million net worth).; and
  • Expand the nature of performance fees that may be paid by BDCs, by allowing fees based on certain unrealized returns.  

Background 

Section 205(a)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) generally prohibits an RIA from charging compensation based on a share of capital gains or capital appreciation (“performance fee”), unless a statutory exception or exemption is met.1  Section 205(b)(3) of the Advisers Act allows a BDC to pay a performance fee subject to certain conditions, but that fee must be computed based on the BDC’s realized capital appreciation.  

In addition, Rule 205-3 under the Advisers Act permits an RIA to charge a performance fee that is based on a share of capital gains or appreciation to an advisory client that is a “qualified client,” which includes thresholds for client assets invested with the RIA (currently $1.4 million) or client net worth (currently $2.7 million). Under the existing qualified client rule, when the client is a Section 3(c)(1) fund, a registered investment company, or a BDC, each equity owner of the fund, investment company, or BDC is treated as a client of the RIA and must meet the qualified client financial thresholds or satisfy an exception or exemption in order for the RIA to charge a performance fee. This typically requires the investment adviser to “look-through” the fund or BDC and confirm that each potential investor meets the qualified client criteria, which can limit the population of investors who are eligible to invest in the fund or BDC and impose operational burdens.

Scope and Conditions of the Proposed Rule

The proposing release includes three notable points concerning the range of clients that an RIA could charge a performance fee. Specifically, the Proposed Rule:  

  • Is not limited to registered funds that invest in private markets, notwithstanding that its key purpose is to facilitate retail access to private assets.  Nor is the Proposed Rule limited to closed-end funds; rather, open-end funds such as mutual funds and ETFs could also pay performance fees if they satisfied the Proposed Rule’s conditions. Moreover, both registered funds and BDCs that are listed on an exchange, as well as registered funds and BDCs that are unlisted, could pay a performance fee if the Proposed Rule’s conditions are met.;
  • Would allow RIAs to charge a performance fee for SMAs where the client meets the accredited investor standard, although the proposing release states that the SEC does not anticipate that use of performance fees for retail SMAs will increase substantially as a result of the rule; and
  • Would not expand the permissibility of unit investment trusts (“UITs”) that operate as registered investment companies to pay a performance fee.

The Proposed Rule would impose certain conditions for an RIA to charge registered funds or BDCs (collectively, “regulated funds”) a performance fee. These conditions, which are detailed below, are intended to protect funds and investors from potential overreaching by the investment adviser with respect to the performance fee.

  • The compensation to the RIA on the basis of a share of the capital gains upon, or the capital appreciation of, the regulated fund does not exceed 20% of the regulated fund’s net capital gains or net capital appreciation over a specified period or as of definite dates;
  • The board of directors of the regulated fund must satisfy the fund governance standards of rule 0-1(a)(7) under the Investment Company Act, which requires that a majority of the regulated fund’s board members are independent and specifies certain responsibilities for the independent board members; and
  • As part of the regulated fund’s annual review and approval of an investment advisory contract required under section 15(c) of the Investment Company Act, the board of directors, including a majority of independent directors, determine that the compensation to the RIA on the basis of a share of the capital gains upon, or the capital appreciation of, the funds, or any portion of the funds, “is in the best interests of the regulated fund and its shareholders.”

The Proposed Rule would revise the disclosure forms used by regulated funds and update disclosure requirements, to reflect when a performance fee is charged.

Implications of the Proposed Rule and Considerations Regarding Payment of Performance Fees by Regulated Funds

If adopted, the Proposed Rule would provide greater flexibility to RIAs and regulated funds with respect to the payment of performance fees.  In addition, for RIAs and sponsors of private funds and regulated funds with similar investment strategies, the Proposed Rule could help align incentives among the RIA and all of these funds and reduce the potential conflict of interest for RIAs to favor private funds that pay performance fees over regulated funds that do not pay a performance fee.

The Proposed Rule would require the regulated fund’s board of directors, including a majority of its independent directors, to make the following written findings concerning the following matters when determining that the payment of a performance fee is in the regulated fund’s and its shareholders’ best interests:

  • The appropriateness of the performance fee arrangement, considering such factors as the regulated fund’s investment strategy and valuation practices;
  • The basis that the performance fee is calculated, including the measurement period over which performance is assessed, and whether such compensation is determined with reference to realized gains, unrealized gains, or both; and
  • The adequacy of any investor protection features in the performance fee arrangement (e.g., a preferred return or hurdle that requires a specified return or yield before the RIA may receive the performance fee, or a high-watermark or loss carryforward mechanism that allows shareholders to recoup losses before performance-based compensation is paid to the RIA), and if no such investor protection features are present, the basis for concluding that the fee arrangement is adequate to protect the interests of shareholders.

This requirement would expand the responsibilities of regulated funds’ boards, and particularly their independent directors. The proposing release addresses, and seeks comments concerning, how to comply with the requirement that the performance fee is in the regulated fund’s best interest and the written findings by the board.  While the rule is still at the proposal stage and some revisions are likely if it is adopted, there are some notable high-level points that RIAs, sponsors, and regulated funds and their boards could begin considering.

Importantly, the proposing release states that the board’s findings are not just a restatement of, or intended to be redundant of, the board’s responsibilities concerning the review and approval of the regulated fund’s investment advisory contract and fees under Section 15(c) of the Investment Company Act.  Nor are they redundant of an RIA’s fiduciary duty to the registered investment company not to charge excessive fees.  Rather, the board would need to make specific findings related to the performance fee arrangement.  

One factor to assess concerning the performance fee arrangement is whether it could incentivize the RIA to take excessive risks to achieve the performance fee, and whether the fee arrangement includes mechanisms to mitigate that incentive.  While the Proposed Rule would not require the performance fee to include hurdles, high-watermarks, or fee clawback provisions, the proposing release explains that such mechanisms could be important features to protect investors and avoid creating incentives for excessive risk-taking.  In addition, the board’s findings and the performance fee’s protective mechanisms would need to be more robust where performance fees would be based in whole or in part of unrealized gains, and where valuation of the regulated fund’s assets can be based on subjective factors because the assets do not have readily available market prices.  This can be common for the assets held by regulated funds that are invested in private securities or alternative investments, and is important given recent SEC focus on valuation processes and disclosures.  Specific board findings and performance fee mechanisms would need to be tailored based on the regulated fund’s specific characteristics, as would corresponding disclosures by the funds.  

Conclusion

The comments period for this proposed rule closes December 7, 2026.  While still at the proposed stage, investment advisers, sponsors, and funds should begin considering whether and how they could utilize the Proposed Rule if it is adopted, and preliminary consideration of the measures they may need to take to comply with the Proposed Rule.  Moreover, this proposal should not be considered in isolation, but rather as part of a range of initiatives by the SEC to increase access for retail investors to private capital, including the interval fund and multiple class rule proposal.  As we have previously discussed, the retailization of private capital poses substantial potential opportunities for the asset management industry and investors, but asset managers entering the retail private capital sector should be cognizant of potential risks and implement reasonable measures to mitigate those risks.
 

***

1  These exceptions and exemptions include: Compensation paid by an investment company or fund that is based on its total value over a definite period or dates, or compensation based on the value of assets under management over a specified period and increasing and decreasing proportionately with the investment performance in relation to the investment record of an appropriate index of securities prices or other permissible measure of investment performance (Sections 205(b)(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act); an advisory contract with a private fund relying on the exclusion in Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act (Section 205(b)(4) of the Advisers Act); or an advisory contract with a person who is a non-U.S. resident (Section 205(b)(5) of the Advisers Act).  

The Proposed Rule would not directly affect advisory contracts between an RIA and a private fund relying on the exclusion in Section 3(c)(7) because the prohibition on in Section 205 of the Advisers Act does not apply to such contracts. 
 

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Authors

Washington, DC

David Nicolardi

Partner
Washington, DC

Melissa R. Hodgman

Partner
New York

Timothy J. Clark

Global Co-Head of Private Funds and Secondaries
New York

Ivet Bell

Partner
New York

Brett Bush

Partner
New York

Jeremy Barr

Counsel
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