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  4. The "28th Regime" and the "EU Inc." – #2: Employee rights and corporate co-determination
8MIN

The "28th Regime" and the "EU Inc." – #2: Employee rights and corporate co-determination

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Nov 18 2026

Besides shareholders and creditors, employees are traditionally one of the three groups which receive the most attention when it comes to the protection of stakeholders as part of EU company law projects. The current discussions around the EU Inc. (see our previous blog post on the background and status of the proposal) are no exception, and questions of employee board representation in particular have (again) emerged as one of the major bones of contention for the project which may well decide over both its political success and its eventual acceptance in practice. In this blog post, we take a closer look at the current state of discussions and what they could effectively contribute to the success (or failure) of the EU Inc.

I. Employee rights and works council law

Regarding general employment law and works council rights, the discussions around the EU Inc. have taken a passive stance. The negotiating position proposed by the Council in October 2026 expressly states that the regulation shall not affect EU or national employment law (cf. Article 1(2) of the draft), with the notable exceptions of co-determination rules (see below) and the introduction of EU employee stock options, which we will cover in a separate blog post.

The rules governing the protection of employees (e.g. wages, working hours, health and safety, protection against dismissal) therefore continue to be governed by the laws applicable to the individual employment relationship, which is normally the law of the country in which the work is habitually carried out (Article 8 Rome I Regulation). The provisions of EU law regarding the information and consultation of employees (including the European Works Council Directives) as well as those concerning transfers of undertakings and collective redundancies (Directives 2001/23/EC and 98/59/EC) shall also apply to an EU Inc. (cf. Recitals 16 and 18 of the Council’s position).

For establishments of an EU Inc. in Germany, this would mean that the Works Constitution Act, the Protection Against Dismissal Act, and Section 613a of the German Civil Code (BGB) would continue to apply without change.

II. Employee co-determination at board level

Employee co-determination at board level ("co-determination") varies greatly between member states: while some states traditionally value it as a core concept of company law, many do not provide for it at all or only to a very limited extent (e.g. only for state-owned enterprises). The topic has therefore always been one of the most controversial stumbling blocks for EU company law legislation.

In its proposal for an EU Inc. Regulation, the Commission has relied on two core principles in this respect (cf. 1. and 2. below) – both of which also remain in place in the Council’s revised negotiating position. The focal point of debate, however, is whether these mechanisms are sufficient or whether additional safeguards are needed (cf. 3. below).

1. Basic principle: co-determination regime at the place of the registered office 

In principle, an EU Inc. that is newly incorporated “ex nihilo” or by way of a purely domestic change of legal form, merger or division shall be subject to the co-determination regime of the member state where it has its registered office (Article 12(1) of the draft regulation). This is in line with established law and practice since questions of co-determination are characterised as a matter of company law and therefore follow the laws of the company’s country of registration.

Example: For an EU Inc. with its registered office in Germany and a workforce which exceeds the national co-determination thresholds (generally 500 or more domestic employees under the One-Third Participation Act (DrittelbG) or generally more than 2,000 domestic employees under the Co-Determination Act (MitbestG)), this would mean that the EU Inc. must establish a supervisory board composed in accordance with German co-determination laws (i.e. 1/3 or 1/2 of the board members being employee representatives).

2. The protection regime for cross-border transformations under Directive (EU) 2017/1132

In addition to this general principle, the Commission proposal has embedded safeguards which protect national co-determination regimes from being undermined by corporate transformations using an EU Inc. in the internal market. In particular, where an EU Inc. is established by way of a cross-border transformation such as a merger, spin-off or change of legal form between two or more member states (or participates in such a transformation at a later stage), the special protection regime established under Directive (EU) 2017/1132 shall apply. This means that mandatory negotiations with a special negotiating body of the employees on the level of co-determination will be required or the European statutory default co-determination regime will apply.

The mechanism effectively prevents an EU Inc. from “fleeing” the co-determination regime of a member state before relevant thresholds are exceeded. It remains uncontested in the newer proposals.

3. Is there a need for more?

Whether or not the rules proposed by the Commission are sufficient has become a focal point of debate. Over the past months, it has been argued again and again that the EU Inc. as a new legal form must not be used to circumvent co-determination rights. This is, of course, a very legitimate concern in principle. The basis of the discussion, however, is ill-founded as it is suggested that an EU Inc. would allow for structures beyond what is already permissible today under the freedom of establishment. This assumption is factually and legally incorrect, as shown in more detail below.

a) The Council’s proposal for a member state option

In its recently adopted negotiating position, the Council has complemented the Commission proposal with an additional member state option. Under this option, a member state may effectively impose its national co-determination regime on an EU Inc. incorporated in a different member state if the company has a branch in its territory and the number of local employees meets its national co-determination thresholds. In such a case, the “foreign” EU Inc. would be obliged to implement one of the following two structures by the end of the following fiscal year:

  1. establish co-determination in accordance with the branch member state’s co-determination laws at the level of the EU Inc. itself, if compatible with the national laws of such state; or
  2. legally separate the local branch into a new entity (e.g. by way of a corporate division, establishment of a subsidiary or similar measures) which then becomes subject to that branch member state’s co-determination regime.

Member states that apply the mechanism must ensure that employees and their representatives can enforce these obligations in court, and that their courts and authorities have jurisdiction to enforce these obligations. According to Recital 16 of the proposal, enforcement should primarily be the responsibility of employees and their representatives.

b) Gap analysis and assessment

The discussions around a potential abuse of the EU Inc. as a tool against local co-determination regimes in general and the Council’s proposed member state option in particular necessitate a gap analysis of the initial proposal. In this respect, we find that the assumption that the EU Inc. would allow for new structures to undermine co-determination (compared to the established “acquis communautaire” and the freedom of establishment) is legally and factually incorrect. This can be demonstrated by going through the relevant scenarios:

  • Scenario 1: A company incorporated in a member state without mandatory co-determination rules (e.g. Belgium) grows across the internal market and one of its branches exceeds co-determination thresholds in another member state. The fact that the Belgian company establishes branches in other member states is protected by the freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU; established case law of the ECJ in decisions such as “Centros”, “Daily Mail” and “Inspire Art”). No co-determination rules apply to the Belgian company because its national company law does not provide for board-level employee representation. This is already the situation today with regard to national legal forms. Under the initial Commission proposal, the EU Inc. would be treated just the same. Under the member state option proposed by the Council, however, the EU Inc. would be treated less favourably than the corresponding national form.
  • Scenario 2: A company (be it a national legal form or an EU Inc.) is soon expected to exceed the thresholds for co-determination in its home member state, which may create an incentive to try to “flee” from local co-determination rules by undergoing a cross-border transformation to a different member state without such rules. In this respect, the employee participation protection regime under Directive (EU) 2017/1132 applies – also in the case of an EU Inc.
  • Scenario 3: Identical to scenario 2, but the company envisages transforming into an SE (which is generally not subject to local co-determination laws). In such a case, the protection regime established under the SE Regulation and the SE Directive applies, irrespective of whether the company has a national legal form or is an EU Inc.

In essence, the EU Inc. therefore does not have any “protection gaps” compared to national legal forms already enjoying freedom of establishment today, and political arguments that co-determination may be at risk are flawed. Moreover, adding further layers to the Commission proposal (e.g. by way of the member state option proposed by the Council) may discriminate against the EU Inc. and thereby create an incentive for growing companies not to use the legal form of an EU Inc.

Example: If a Belgian B.V. (no mandatory co-determination regime) has a branch in Germany where the number of employees exceeds the German co-determination thresholds, Germany cannot impose its co-determination regime on the Belgian company which enjoys freedom of establishment in the internal market. However, if the company were a Belgian EU Inc. and Germany were to use the member state option proposed by the Council, it could force the Belgian EU Inc. into either establishing a co-determination regime or carving out its German business. In conclusion, the EU Inc. would be treated less favourably than a national legal form. This constitutes a major disincentive to choosing the legal form of an EU Inc. Companies would be better off opting for national legal forms so as not to run into this risk when expanding into other member states.

III. Outlook

Once the European Parliament has adopted its formal position, trilogue negotiations on the proposal can commence and may progress swiftly. The reach of member states’ co-determination regimes will likely continue to be a focal point during these discussions. In this respect, decision-makers at EU level will be well advised to look at the “acquis communautaire” of EU company law as it stands, in particular with regard to the freedom of establishment in the internal market. The EU Inc. should not fall behind this, or else companies and founders may take note of the associated risks and drawbacks and rely on established national legal forms instead.

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Tags

corporatepolitical changecorporate advisory and governanceemerging companiesemployment disputeslabour relationsgermanyeurope

Authors

Düsseldorf

Thomas Müller-Bonanni

Partner
Frankfurt am Main

Philip Denninger

Senior Knowledge Lawyer
Düsseldorf

Alice Jenner

Counsel
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