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  4. Show me the money (responsibly): The FCA’s Remuneration Reform
5MIN

Show me the money (responsibly): The FCA’s Remuneration Reform

Nov 3 2026

The FCA's consultation on reforming the remuneration framework for solo-regulated firms (CP26/27) closed on 16 September 2026 (see our earlier blog in August for a walkthrough of the key proposals). 

The proposals represent one of the most significant overhauls of the FCA's remuneration framework in recent years. By replacing multiple overlapping remuneration codes with a single regime and placing greater emphasis on proportionality and outcomes, the FCA is seeking to create a framework that is more simple, clear and competitive.

As the market now awaits the FCA's Policy Statement, expected in Q1 2027, we highlight the aspects of the proposals likely to have the greatest practical significance for firms, alongside several areas where important open points remain.

(A) Meaningful simplification for a more proportionate framework

The remuneration reforms sit within a broader FCA trend towards more proportionate, flexible and outcomes-focused regulation. Similar themes can be seen in the recent proposals affecting the AIFM regime and fund reporting requirements. The overall direction of travel is clear: reducing unnecessary operational burdens, removing artificial regulatory thresholds and giving firms greater flexibility to tailor governance arrangements to the scale and nature of their businesses.

1. Consolidated framework, streamlined governance and reporting

The FCA proposes replacing the three existing remuneration codes, the AIFM Remuneration Code (SYSC 19B), the UCITS Remuneration Code (SYSC 19E) and the MIFIDPRU Remuneration Code (SYSC 19G), with a single, consolidated Solo-Regulated Firms Remuneration Code (SYSC 19AA), shifting from prescriptive rules to an outcomes-focused framework which pares back governance and reporting obligations. 

The proposal should materially reduce compliance costs, particularly for groups containing firms subject to different existing remuneration codes with subtle but important differences. The move towards an outcomes-focused framework, underpinned by an explicit proportionality principle, would also give firms greater flexibility to design remuneration arrangements that better align with their business models and risk profiles.

However, given the FCA's stated aim of simplification, firms would benefit from greater certainty that compliance with the existing remuneration regimes will place them in compliance with SYSC 19AA, so an overhaul of existing remuneration decisions will not be required.

Firms will, of course, need to continue documenting the rationale underpinning their remuneration policies, including how those arrangements support appropriate risk management and outcomes.

The FCA has also taken material steps to cut out duplication where objectives can already be addressed through other governance and supervisory arrangements, including the proposed removal of mandatory Remuneration Committees, annual independent reviews, and the MIF008 remuneration reporting template. These will make a material difference to the compliance burden and associated costs for the industry, particularly for smaller firms.

2. Defining scope and softening cliff edges for growth

The proposals to remove small and non-interconnected (SNI) MIFIDPRU firms from scope, and the removal of the tiered structure under the current MIFIDPRU code would encourage growth for firms, without the risk of significant regulatory tripwires in the form of additional prescriptive requirements applying at arbitrary growth thresholds. Firms would be able to develop remuneration frameworks that evolve alongside their business.

For UK AIFMs, the proposed scaling of requirements so that the code applies only to medium and large firms appears broadly proportionate. Subject to the outcome of the wider AIFMD reform package, smaller AIFMs (with aggregate assets under management below £750 million) would benefit from a meaningful reduction in compliance obligations.

3. Deferral and optional performance adjustments

A principles-based approach to deferral (if adopted) is likely to give firms greater flexibility to tailor remuneration arrangements to their particular business model and investment strategies. An asset-based threshold trigger (the FCA’s alternative approach) would sit awkwardly with the range of investment strategies and holding periods across the private capital industry, and risks the same cliff-edge problem the FCA is trying to avoid.

Similarly, the greater flexibility in structuring variable remuneration, including buy-outs, should ease a significant friction point in talent recruitment.  The proposal to require firms only to consider malus and clawback as examples of performance adjustment mechanisms, rather than mandating their inclusion in remuneration arrangements, may be viewed as a welcome recognition that asset management firms typically rely on other mechanisms (bad leaver provisions, for instance) to achieve the same alignment of incentives. Whether that change would actually make a significant practical difference is less clear – under the current remuneration codes there is no express obligation on firms to apply malus and clawback, even where such tools are available. 

(B) Areas to watch ahead of the Policy Statement

Whilst the overall direction of travel is clear, a number of important questions remain around the detailed operation of the proposed framework. We are hopeful that the Policy Statement may provide further clarity on the following areas.

1. Material Risk Takers (MRTs)

The FCA intends to narrow the population of MRTs, however, the new proposed definition may give rise to uncertainty in practice. In particular, the concept of having a “material impact” on clients’ or investors’ interests could be interpreted narrowly, applying only to individuals with ultimate investment decision-making authority, or more broadly, encompassing those who play a significant role in portfolio management, client transactions, valuation or investment processes.  Given the FCA’s intention to narrow the population of MRTs it is reasonable to conclude that individuals who are not MRTs under the current remuneration codes should not be MRTs under the new code.

2. “Remuneration” definition

The breadth of the proposed glossary definition of “remuneration” (covering “any transfer” of units or shares of the AIF or UCITS scheme for the benefit of a MRT) risks capturing co-investment arrangements. Our view is that co-investment is not remuneration as it is a capital commitment made on arm’s-length terms and at the individual’s own risk. We would hope that this distinction between remuneration and investment should be recognised notwithstanding the breadth of the FCA’s proposed definition.

3. Transitional arrangements 

As drafted, firms will be required to continue applying legacy deferral, malus and clawback arrangements (and the associated reporting) for performance periods that predate the new code, potentially for several years after SYSC 19AA takes effect in Q1 2027. Existing reporting requirements would continue to apply to those legacy arrangements. As a result, some of the benefits of simplification may be delayed for a considerable period. An important point to watch will be whether the final rules permit an (optional) full transition to SYSC 19AA, including in respect of legacy remuneration arrangements.

Tags

incentivesfcafinancial institutionsfinancial servicesinvestment funds and managersthe financial conduct authorityemployment incentives and pensionsfinancial services regulationunited kingdom

Authors

London

James Smethurst

Partner
London

Julia Robilliard-Smith

Senior Associate
London

Janice Leung

Associate
London

Holly Insley

Partner
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