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  4. FX forwards and the ancillary services privilege: when do payment institutions need a separate MiFID2 license?
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FX forwards and the ancillary services privilege: when do payment institutions need a separate MiFID2 license?

Nov 10 2026

The delineation between commercial activities and the provision of regulated financial services has long given rise to questions of legal interpretation. Under European and national financial regulatory frameworks, the question has not been answered uniformly across Member States as to when market participants may rely on the so-called ancillary services privilege. The core premise is intuitive: where a financial activity is merely a subordinate, functional annex to an underlying commercial or operational activity, it should not automatically trigger the full weight of banking, payment, or investment services supervision. However, specifically under German supervisory law, Bafin tends to take a restrictive approach unless statutory law provides for an explicit exemption.

The precise scope of this privilege is increasingly attracting judicial scrutiny. In our earlier blog post of the landmark judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Betaal Garant Nederland  (Case C-51/25), we examined the CJEU’s recognition of an accessoriness doctrine under Directive 2366/2015/EU (PSD2), pursuant to which certain intermediary security and escrow arrangements fall outside the scope of payment services authorisation requirements. That judgment raises the question whether the CJEU has recognised a more general ancillary services privilege. At the national level, German courts, most recently the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht – OLG) Stuttgart, have likewise reinforced that dependent ancillary credit extensions do not necessarily constitute regulated banking business.

Now, on 5 November 2026, in Iulicris Recycling SRL v Ibanfirst SA (Case C-339/25), the CJEU has added a new dimension to this debate. While the CJEU in Betaal Garant and the OLG Stuttgart addressed whether unregulated commercial actors are inadvertently drawn into regulatory oversight, Iulicris tackles the inverse and practically pressing cross-sectoral question which can be broadly summarised as follows: Can a payment institution rely on its ancillary right to offer currency derivatives under its existing PSD2 license without obtaining an additional investment firm license under Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID2)?

I. The decision in Iulicris Recycling v Ibanfirst (Case C-339/25)

1. The factual background

The dispute arose between Romanian recycling company Iulicris Recycling and Ibanfirst SA, an authorized Belgian payment institution. Iulicris had operational payment commitments in Romanian Lei (RON) but invoiced its scrap metal clients in US Dollars (USD). To mitigate exchange rate volatility, Iulicris opened multi-currency accounts with Ibanfirst and entered into three "flexible forward contracts" fixing exchange rates for several million USD against RON.

Following market fluctuations, Ibanfirst issued substantial margin calls. Iulicris paid over USD 890,000 and nearly RON 1.5 million before refusing further collateral demands. When Ibanfirst notified Iulicris that the positions had matured and threatened to close them out, Iulicris claimed that the forward contracts were void ab initio as unlawful, unlicensed investment services, demanding full reimbursement of all margin payments.

The Belgian court stayed proceedings and referred the question to the CJEU: Must currency forward contracts, in order to qualify as closely linked ancillary services that payment institutions are entitled to provide under Art. 18(1)(a) PSD2, either (i) satisfy the “payment exclusion” under Art. 10(1)(b) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 (MiFID2 DR) or (ii) meet the requirements for incidental provision under Art. 2(1)(c) MiFID2 and Art. 4 MiFID2 DR?

2. The CJEU’s reasoning: no blanket shield under PSD2

The CJEU confirmed that payment institutions may offer currency forward contracts as ancillary services closely linked to their payment services under Art. 18(1)(a) PSD2. No separate MiFID2 licence is required if the contracts fall within the “payment exclusion” under Art. 10(1)(b) MiFID2 DR. If the contracts instead qualify as financial instruments and the services constitute investment services under MiFID2, the institution must meet the conditions of the incidental provision exemption under Art. 2(1)(c) MiFID2 and Art. 4 MiFID2 DR to provide those services without a separate MiFID2 licence. 

  • PSD2 ancillary scope covers forward FX in principle: Under Art. 18(1)(a) PSD2, payment institutions may provide operational and closely linked ancillary services, explicitly including "foreign exchange services". The Court clarified that this term is not strictly confined to spot FX transactions executed at the current exchange rate but can in principle encompass forward contracts fixing a future rate.
  • No priority of PSD2 over MiFID2 investor protection: The Court rejected the notion that the PSD2 framework acts as a lex specialis excluding MiFID2. The mere fact that an instrument is offered as an ancillary service to a payment transaction cannot displace the investor protection and market transparency objectives enshrined in MiFID2.
  • The Court subsequently applied a two-step regulatory test: The assessment whether a MIFID2 license is required in addition to a PSD2 license requires determining, first, whether the contract qualifies as a financial instrument and, if so, whether the investment service falls within the MiFID2 incidental provision exemption.
    • Step 1: Is the contract a financial instrument? Under Art. 10(1)(b) of MiFID2 DR (also referred to as “payment exclusion”), currency derivatives do not qualify as financial instruments if four cumulative criteria are met: (i) physical settlement (it must be physically settled other than by reason of a default or termination event), (ii) entered into by at least one non-financial counterparty, (iii) entered into specifically to facilitate payments for goods, services, or direct investment, and (iv) not traded on a trading venue. If these criteria are met, the contract falls outside MiFID2 entirely.
    • Step 2: If it is a financial instrument, is it provided only "occasionally"? If the contract does not meet the “payment exclusion” criteria and thus remains a MiFID2 derivative, a payment institution can only distribute it without a MiFID2 license if it satisfies the "incidental/occasional provision" exemption under Art. 2(1)(c) MiFID2, specified in Art. 4 of MiFID2 DR. Under Art. 2(1)(c) MiFID2, persons providing investment services on an incidental basis in the course of a professional activity are exempt from MiFID2, provided that the activity is governed by legal or regulatory provisions or a professional code of ethics that do not preclude the provision of those services. This essentially requires:
      1. An objective and close connection between the professional payment activity and the investment service provided to the same client;
      2. The service must not aim to provide a systematic source of revenue for the payment institution; and
      3. The payment institution must not market or advertise its ability to provide investment services, unless explicitly disclosed to clients as merely ancillary to its core payment services.

II. A growing body of jurisprudence: the broader EU and national picture

The Iulicris ruling forms part of a broader judicial trend addressing the boundaries of ancillary financial services across different regulatory regimes.

1. The EU dimension: Betaal Garant Nederland (Case C-51/25)

As discussed in our earlier blog post, the CJEU held in Betaal Garant (judgment of 16 July 2026) that a commercial escrow provider offering construction completion guarantees (holding funds in a linked foundation's account and releasing them only upon verified defect-free handover) was not providing a licensable payment remittance service under PSD2.

Crucially, the CJEU in Betaal Garant gave substantial weight to recital 24 PSD2 (and the purpose reflected in Art. 1(2)(b) PSD2), emphasizing that the directive’s supervisory regime is directed at providers engaging in payment services "as a regular occupation or business activity". Applying full-scale regulatory requirements to commercial actors who merely facilitate money transfers as an ancillary component of a distinct main service was, in essence, deemed disproportionate.

2. The German national dimension: OLG Stuttgart (judgment of 1 August 2025 – 7 ORs 28 SRs 970/23)

Parallel developments are unfolding in national jurisprudence. In a decision handed down on 1 August 2025, the OLG Stuttgart addressed whether a gaming machine operator who granted interest-free cash advances (Vorschüsse) to pub owners, to be repaid by offsetting against future revenue shares from the machines, was operating an unauthorized lending business under Sec. 32(1) in conjunction with Sec. 1(1) sent. 2 no. 2 of the German Banking Act (KWG).

The OLG Stuttgart held that no banking license was required. The court reaffirmed the doctrine of the dependent ancillary service:

  • Where credit is extended solely to serve and secure a commercial main business (in this case, placing and operating gaming machines), the statutory prerequisites for licensing, specifically commerciality (Gewerbsmäßigkeit) and the requirement for a commercially organized business operation, must attach to the lending business itself, not to the overall commercial enterprise.
  • Because the advances were granted interest-free, there was no independent profit-seeking intent or remuneration tied to the lending activity, which is required under German law for a service to constitute licensable lending business.
  • The court confirmed that granting credit with a purely supportive function to a real-economy commercial contract does not run counter to the regulatory purpose of the KWG (which focuses on the protection of the credit system and preventing usurious lending).

3. The crucial distinction: unregulated commercial players vs dual sectoral licensing

While these cases all explore accessoriness, they address two different regulatory angles:

  • In Betaal Garant and before the OLG Stuttgart, the courts applied the accessoriness doctrine to protect non-financial market participants from supervisory overreach. The rationale was that where the financial component is strictly subordinate and non-commercial in isolation, the systemic and customer risks targeted by financial regulation are absent.
  • In Iulicris, however, the dynamic is reversed. Here, an already-authorized payment institution sought to utilize the ancillary permissions in PSD2 as a gateway to distribute financial derivatives. The CJEU made it clear that a PSD2 license cannot be used as a backdoor to bypass MiFID2. The high level of investor protection required for derivative instruments cannot be diluted simply because the provider is a payment institution and the contract is arranged alongside a payment account.

IV. The reverse question: do investment firms need a payment license for ancillary settlement? 

The cross-sectoral friction analyzed in Iulicris inevitably raises the reverse question: Must an investment firm hold a separate payment institution license under PSD2 if it processes payments as an ancillary component of its investment business?

Under applicable national frameworks, this is not entirely clear:

  • The statutory exclusion for securities settlement: In many instances, investment firms can rely on the specific statutory carve-out under Art. 3(h) PSD2 (as transposed in Germany by Sec. 2 (1) no. 8 of the Payment Services Supervisory Act (ZAG), which explicitly excludes payment transactions connected with the servicing, redemption, or sale of securities from the scope of payment regulation. The exact scope of the exemption remains unclear.
  • Potential licensing overlaps: Outside this specific settlement carve-out, the legal position is not free from doubt. Under German law, for example, it is debated whether the bundling of ancillary services under Sec. 15(1) and (2) of the German Investment Firm Act (WpIG) absorbs typically connected payment activities into the investment services license. Based on a plain reading of Sec. 15 (7) WpIG, the provision prohibits the combination of a WpIG license with, among others, a payment services license under the ZAG. However, supporters argue that Sec. 15 (7) WpIG is intended to avoid overlapping regulatory regimes and therefore implies that related payment activities are covered by the WpIG license. Absent any further legislative or regulatory guidance, it remains doubtful whether the provision extends the scope of the WpIG license or simply prohibits holding both licenses.

Whether an investment firm may process payments beyond the securities-related PSD2 payment exclusion without a separate payment services licence therefore remains unsettled. Although Iulicris does not resolve this reverse question, it illustrates why permission to provide ancillary services under one regulatory regime cannot, by itself, be treated as an exemption from another.

V. Key takeaways 

The Iulicris judgment delivers clarity and also several warnings for payment institutions:

  • Audit of FX product portfolios: Payment institutions offering FX forwards, flexible forwards, or hedging solutions must strictly review whether their contracts meet all four cumulative criteria under Art. 10(1)(b) MiFID2 DR. 
  • The "occasional" exemption is narrow: Whether the exemption applies depends on the nature and scope of the investment services provided. Specialised FX providers face significant regulatory risk if they rely on the exemption for investment services provided on an incidental basis under Art. 2(1)(c) MiFID2. The exemption does not apply if FX derivatives generate systematic fee income, are actively marketed as treasury solutions, or form part of a standard product range rather than being tailored to a particular payment transaction and offered only occasionally. 
  • Severe civil and contractual claims: Operating an unlicensed investment service exposes institutions to significant private law risks. Counterparties may assert that derivative contracts are void or voidable, triggering restitution and clawback claims regarding margin payments and losses (as sought by Iulicris), alongside supervisory enforcement. 

Tags

financial servicesregulatory framework

Authors

Frankfurt am Main

Alicia Hildner

Counsel
Frankfurt am Main

Alexander Glos

Partner & Co-head Financial Institutions Group
Frankfurt am Main

Daniel Klingenbrunn

Principal Associate
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