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  4. FSR investigations meet China's blocking orders: companies caught between Brussels and Beijing
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FSR investigations meet China's blocking orders: companies caught between Brussels and Beijing

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Nov 9 2026

The Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) allows the European Commission (the Commission) to scrutinise foreign subsidies granted to companies active in the European Union (the EU), regardless of where they are headquartered. In practice, a significant proportion of the Commission's in-depth investigations have been into Chinese companies and Chinese state support measures. Against this background, China has adopted a Regulation Countering Unlawful Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction (the Regulation) in April 2026. Although not directed specifically at the FSR, the Regulation has as of this date already been invoked twice to restrict compliance with the Commission’s investigative measures in FSR cases involving China-headquartered companies. Chinese companies with meaningful business in the EU must now balance a difficult equation: cooperating with Brussels may breach Chinese law, and refusing to cooperate may breach EU law.

The Commission’s wide investigative powers and focus on China

The concept of “foreign financial contribution” (FFC) is at the heart of the FSR. Because the origin of FFCs is by definition linked to third countries, information pertaining to their nature and quantum often sits in those countries. The Commission's investigative toolbox reflects this: it may request scrutinised companies and third parties to provide “all necessary information”. It can also carry out dawn raids in the EU – and in third countries, provided the government concerned has been notified and does not object – and request access to any relevant information, which can extend to data stored on servers abroad. 

Non-cooperation comes at a price. For incomplete or missing information, or obstructed inspections, the Commission can impose fines up to 1% of aggregate turnover and/or periodic penalty payments up to 5% of average daily turnover for each working day of delay. It may also adopt a decision based on “facts available”, generally to the detriment of the investigated companies. The consequences of this are illustrated in the FSP.103117 – Metro Lisbon decision, where the Commission based its entire subsidy assessment on “facts available”, much to the detriment of the investigated company (see our Blog here).

The Commission has not hesitated to use the FSR against Chinese companies since its adoption. In April 2024, it raided the Polish and Dutch premises of the security-scanner manufacturer Nuctech, which was its first ex officio in-depth investigation. In December 2025, dawn raids were conducted at Temu’s Irish premises, where Temu’s behaviour resulted in the first Statement of Grounds over an alleged inspection obstruction. All of the FSR’s public procurement in-depth investigations targeted Chinese companies (e.g. CRRC, Shanghai Electric and LONGi Solar Technology). For M&A, the Commission opened, in May 2026, an in-depth investigation into JD.com’s proposed acquisition of Ceconomy which was ultimately conditionally cleared in November 2026 (see, also, in our Blog here). Finally, Chinese companies were targeted in all in-depth ex officio investigations to date (Nuctech, December 2025; Goldwind, February 2026).

These actions have unfolded against the backdrop of an increasingly fraught trade relationship between the EU and China, which also shapes the debate on the Commission's proposed Industrial Accelerator Act (see our Blog here). On the European side, several calls have been made to fully utilise the FSR’s available tools to counteract perceived market distortions caused by subsidised Chinese goods and services. In China, the FSR is increasingly perceived as a protectionist tool disproportionately targeting Chinese companies, thereby becoming a recurring source of friction with the EU.

Can Chinese law shield companies from the Commission’s information requests?

The Commission’s investigative powers have now encountered pushback when deployed against Chinese companies. Certain Chinese laws restrict information from leaving the country. This has led Chinese companies to challenge the Commission’s measures, by seeking interim relief – without success – and contesting them before the EU Courts – where no conclusion has yet been reached.

In the Nuctech dawn raids, the Commission sought access to emails archived on the parent company’s servers in China. The company applied for interim measures (T-284/24 R) arguing that handing over data stored in China would breach Chinese data security rules (requiring an authorisation by Chinese authorities) and State secrecy rules. 

The General Court dismissed the application in August 2024. On the Court's reading, Nuctech failed to show that the mailboxes contained State secrets or that the required data law authorisation had been sought and refused. The Court added that if the Commission did not have the right to request information outside the EU, it would be unable to conduct effective investigations and would jeopardize its ability to hold non-EU companies accountable. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) upheld that order on appeal in March 2025 (C-720/24 P(R)) based on urgency not being established, but the merits remain undecided (T-284/24). In the meantime, the Commission has already relied on the Nuctech order to dismiss arguments regarding inability to access data stored in China raised in the FSP.103117 – Metro Lisbon decision under the FSR’s public procurement module.

Similarly, Goldwind sought to suspend an information request under Article 13(2) FSR (T-335/26 R) and challenged the scope of the opening decision (T-335/26). On 20 July 2026, the General Court rejected the application for lack of urgency. 

Both orders leave the Commission's requests fully in force, but the central questions will have to be decided on the merits: can Chinese rules justify non-cooperation or prevent a fine? The General Court hearings in April 2026, have focused on whether the accessibility obstacles of the China-stored data were technical (Nuctech's own IT architecture choices) or legal (genuine Chinese-law restrictions). Should the latter be considered justifiable, the Chinese response could provide comfort to the companies involved. Nuctech’s judgment could reasonably be expected in the coming months, with Goldwind’s likely to follow later. 

China's latest response: from trade barrier to blocking orders

In January 2025, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce classified the Commission's FSR practice as a trade barrier. In April 2026, the State Council adopted the Regulation on Countering Unlawful Extra-territorial Jurisdiction, empowering China to take countermeasures against foreign measures deemed harmful to Chinese sovereignty, security and development interests, or the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and organisations. 

In May 2026, the Ministry of Justice used the Regulation for the first time, by issuing a blocking order restricting any organisation or individual from complying with or assisting in implementing the Commission’s cross-border investigative measures in the Nuctech investigation which were deemed to constitute unlawful extraterritorial jurisdiction. A similar blocking order regarding the investigation of JD.com followed just three months later, with a Ministry spokesperson criticising the Commission for arbitrarily demanding extensive and unnecessary information from Chinese entities.

The circle of those affected is wide

The prohibition is not limited to the company under investigation. The Regulation provides that, once an improper foreign measure has been identified, no organisation or individual may implement it or help to implement it. This potentially catches:

  • Chinese parent companies and group entities that hold the requested information;
  • Chinese banks whose loans are under scrutiny; 
  • managers and employees asked for documents stored in China;
  • third parties in China (e.g. competitors, customers, suppliers) receiving information requests. 

EU-based companies are not unaffected either. An EU company receiving financial contributions attributable to China – e.g., loans from Chinese state-owned banks – could face the same dilemma if the Commission requests information on that financing from the company’s Chinese subsidiaries and/or its Chinese lenders.

Consequences extending well beyond reputational risk

Despite there being no enforcement yet, consequences for breaching the Regulation can be severe:

  • Under Article 8 of the Regulation, any “foreign” company or individual who “promotes or participates in the implementation” of an identified improper foreign measure risks being included into the “Malicious Entity List”, subject to entry bans, asset freezes in China, restrictions on data transfers, bans on trade with and investment in China, or fines. These consequences may further extend to the companies that are actually controlled by, or whose establishment or operation involves the participation of, companies or individuals included on the Malicious Entity List. 
  • Under Articles 12 and 13 of the Regulation, any company or individual, not limited to foreign ones, who “implement or assist in implementing” an identified improper foreign measure may face investigations by the relevant departments of the State Council and/or a prohibition order. Chinese citizens or companies whose lawful rights and interests are infringed as a result may sue for injunctions and damages before Chinese courts. The way out is narrow: in “special circumstances”, companies may apply to the Chinese State Council's legal affairs department for permission to comply.

In addition, violations of the Regulation more generally may even give rise to criminal liability where they constitute a criminal offence.

Key takeaways and looking ahead

The blocking orders are unlikely to halt FSR enforcement, with the Commission maintaining that its investigative measures are consistent with the EU’s international obligations. However, they may affect the Commission’s assessment, which will likely rely more heavily on decisions based on “facts available” insofar as they relate to FFCs originating in China. 

This could place a greater burden on companies to substantiate the absence of distortion despite the Chinese subsidies that may have been received. In notified transactions, in particular, the parties’ strong incentive to obtain clearance may also make remedies an increasingly relevant means of addressing the Commission’s concerns, as illustrated by the recent JD.com/Ceconomy clearance.

For companies from, or with significant operations in China, practical steps can be taken to reduce exposure:

  • Run a risk assessment early on. For deals or bids where material Chinese FFCs will need to be disclosed (e.g., Chinese financing, state-linked investors or lenders), map the relevant FFCs, and identify where the underlying information sits. Assess what could be caught by Chinese data-security and State secrecy rules or other restrictions, and consider the impact on timeline / outcome, incl. potential commitments.
  • Manage the timeline of the FSR workstream. For high-profile deals with a significant Chinese nexus, frontloading the FSR workstream as much as possible can lower the risk of a subsequent blocking order impacting the deal timeline, as these do not apply retroactively.
  • Reflect risk in deal documents. Where possible, seek contractual protection through cooperation and information-sharing clauses, or efforts obligations and warranties, that allocate timing and remedy risk if counterparties (e.g., Chinese JV co-investors), third parties or the scrutinized company cannot provide China-held information to the regulators. 
  • Build the evidentiary record upfront. To mitigate the risk of the Commission relying on “facts available”, be ready to substantiate the absence of distortion with information that can be produced without breaching Chinese law. This can include information accessible in the EU, publicly available Chinese information, or circumstances such as limited intra-group transfers from any Chinese FFC recipients. 
  • Do not rely on Chinese law as a blanket excuse. Substantiate each restriction relied on, pursue the available routes to permission, and document the efforts made.
  • Monitor developments. Both the FSR and the Chinese regulatory response remain a new and evolving legal framework, with limited enforcement practice and several questions still unsettled. The General Court's merits rulings in Nuctech and Goldwind, and any further blocking orders, may therefore provide further clarity or even change the analysis.

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Tags

antitrust and competitionstate aid and subsidieschinaeurope

Authors

Tokyo

Laurent Bougard

Partner
Munich

Ilka Oberländer

Partner

Hazel Yin

Partner, Freshfields RuiMin
Brussels

Isabel Chaves

Associate
Brussels

Kryštof Žáček

Associate
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