Dividend withholding tax in Italy: what the iShares and Neo Group decisions mean for private equity
Within one month, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued two decisions on withholding tax on cross-border dividends. Both matter to private equity sponsors investing in Italy.
- iShares (C‑139/25, 17 September 2026) strengthens the position whereby non-EU funds should not be taxed more heavily than domestic funds.
- Neo Group (C‑203/25, 15 October 2026) tightens anti-abuse scrutiny of dividends flowing up holding chains under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. However, in our view, it should not materially increase the risk for typical private equity structures. These are usually set up at the time of investment and possible changes generally reflect commercial reasons. Moreover, where the fund at the top is comparable to an Italian or EU fund, using an EU holding company should give no undue tax advantage and therefore no abuse.
For each decision, this post sets out the facts, the principles and the practical impact for private equity.
iShares: no discriminatory withholding on comparable non-EU funds
The facts
- A US investment fund received dividends from Spanish companies. Spain withheld 15% under the Spain–US tax treaty. Spanish funds paid 1%.
- The fund was tax-transparent in the US: it passed the dividends and the related foreign tax credit to its investors.
- Spain argued that the treaty credit mechanism removed the difference.
The principles stated by the CJEU
- Taxing non-resident funds more heavily than resident funds restricts the free movement of capital. It does not matter that the foreign fund is transparent or passes the tax burden to its investors.
- Once the source state taxes the dividends of both resident and non-resident funds, their situations become comparable. In iShares, the CJEU did not carry out this assessment itself and simply relied on the Spanish court's finding that the funds were comparable (paragraph 44) .
- A merely theoretical tax credit is not enough. A treaty removes the discrimination only if the full rate difference is actually deducted in all cases. If relief is claimed at investor level, the national court must check that investors can actually deduct the whole difference.
Impact for private equity
- Italy has the same gap:
- Italian funds, and EU/EEA funds with a supervised manager, are exempt from dividend withholding tax.
- Non-EU funds suffer a 26% withholding tax (or, in certain circumstances, the treaty rate applicable to each of the fund’s investors under a look-through approach).
- The Italian Supreme Court has taken the same line since 2022. It held that a US fund cannot be taxed more heavily than comparable Italian funds. A tax treaty does not shield discriminatory treatment, and the treaty's exchange of information rules out a tax-control justification. iShares reinforces this case law.
- Impacts for past years. Foreign investors which suffered Italian income taxation could claim for refund within 48 months of payment (Article 38, Presidential Decree 602/1973) provided that sufficient documentation is gathered (residence certificates; financial statements; withholding tax certificates; evidence of beneficial ownership).
- Impacts for the future. We believe iShares lends further support to the position of comparable non-EU funds. This should improve the defensibility of their exemption from dividend withholding tax (and capital gain tax) and may, in turn, make the risk more readily insurable.
Neo Group: tighter anti-abuse scrutiny of holding chains
The facts
- Lithuanian subsidiaries paid about EUR 28.5 million in dividends to their Cypriot parent, exempt from withholding tax.
- Above the parent, the Belize company that controlled it sold the parent's shares for EUR 310.4 million:
- the buyer was a Cypriot holding company set up less than three months earlier;
- payment was deferred to 2027;
- the receivable was assigned to the individual who owned both seller and buyer;
- the buyer paid down the debt with dividend money received as loans and assignments.
- Lithuania treated the chain as non-genuine. It charged EUR 2.25 million of withholding tax, plus a penalty, to the Lithuanian subsidiary that paid the dividends.
The principles stated by the CJEU
- Substance is not enough. The exemption can be denied even if the parent carries on a real economic activity. The anti-abuse rules are not limited to conduit companies (ie holding companies that simply pass income on). The tax authorities must examine the transaction as a whole.
- Timing is not decisive. The Court lists two signs that may point to abuse: (a) the amounts passed up the chain match the dividends received; and (b) the dividends are passed on shortly after they are received. These are indications only, not general presumptions of abuse. In addition, the Court notes that abuse can also exist where money is not passed straight away, but at regular intervals over a period of time. Tax authorities therefore cannot limit their review to a short period. They must consider all the relevant facts, including, where relevant, any change in the group structure and any related loans.
- Later events may be taken into account. A structure set up for valid commercial reasons can become non-genuine if it is kept after those reasons have gone.
- The whole chain is in scope. The source state can look at transactions abroad. The tax advantage may arise at any level, including for the individual at the top.
- Intent need only be shown for one party: at least one group company or the individual who benefits. The paying subsidiary’s awareness is not required to prove abuse, but the burden of proof stays with the tax authorities.
Impact for private equity
- Broader scrutiny, and substance alone is no longer enough. Neo Group confirms two points:
- tax authorities may carry out a wide-ranging review to establish whether there is abuse;
- substance at the level of the intermediate holding company remains essential, but it is no longer enough on its own to rule out abuse.
The facts of the case are specific, however. The regular upstream flow of dividends was not challenged as such: as noted above, it does not in itself create a general presumption of abuse. The challenge rested on other signs of abuse, namely an intra-group reorganisation designed to put the individual at the top of the group in a position to receive dividends free of withholding tax.
- Typical PE structures are different. PE structures are usually defined from a legal and financial perspective at the time of investment, and exits or repatriations are not normally preceded by reorganisations designed to access the exemption or reduce the applicable withholding tax rate. Moreover, in our view, a reorganisation carried out at the time of an exit or repatriation should not, in itself, be used as grounds to challenge the withholding tax exemption where it is driven by genuine commercial reasons (such as add-on acquisitions, the entry of new investors, management investment or a pre-exit carve-out). On this basis, Neo Group should not, in our view, materially increase the risk profile of typical PE structures.
- No undue tax advantage, no abuse. Suppose the tax authorities rely on Neo Group to deny the withholding tax exemption to an intermediate holding company in a PE structure. In our view, there should still be no abuse, because abuse requires an intention to obtain a tax advantage in contrast with the purpose of the rules. If the intermediate vehicle is held by a non-EU fund comparable to an Italian or EU fund and resident in a country that exchanges tax information with Italy, iShares and the Italian case law suggest that the fund would itself be entitled to the same exemption had it invested directly. Using the intermediate vehicle would therefore give no undue tax advantage, and, in line with Nordcurrent , there would be no abuse.
Conclusion
At first sight, the two decisions point in different directions. On a closer reading, however, they are consistent with each other and, in our view, should not harm private equity investors.
(i) iShares strengthens the case for treating comparable non-EU funds in the same way as Italian and EU funds, and therefore for exempting them from taxes on Italian source income.
(ii) Neo Group means that holding chains will be judged on the transaction as a whole, not only on the substance of the first recipient. This includes any restructuring, loans and transfers of receivables. In our view, this should not materially increase the risk for typical private equity structures, because:
(a) the legal and financial structure is generally defined at the outset, and exits or repatriations are not normally preceded by reorganisations designed to access the exemption;
(b) later changes usually reflect commercial reasons, such as add-on acquisitions, the entry of new investors, management investment or a pre-exit carve-out.
In addition, if the fund at the top of the chain is comparable to an Italian or EU fund and resident in a country that exchanges tax information with Italy, there should be no undue tax advantage, and therefore no abuse.
In other cases (Finanzamt für Großbetriebe, C‑602/23, 30 April 2025), the CJEU listed the essential elements that make a non-EU fund comparable to an EU fund: (a) investor protection; (b) information obligations, such as a prospectus and half-yearly and annual reports; (c) the authorised business activity; and (d) effective supervision and control.
The Italian tax authorities takes a similar approach, although its guidance was issued for other purposes, not for dividend withholding tax. Under its most recent guidance (Circular 23/E of 19 November 2024), a non-EU fund is treated like an EU fund where: (a) it is established in a country that allows an adequate exchange of information with Italy; (b) its assets are raised from a plurality of investors and managed collectively, in the investors' interest and independently of them, under a predetermined investment policy; and (c) the fund or its manager is subject to prudential supervision and to rules substantially equivalent to the UCITS or AIFM Directives. Earlier guidance follows the same line. A foreign fund qualifies whatever its legal form or tax status, as long as it has the same substantive features and investment aims as Italian funds and either the fund or its manager is supervised.
According to the facts of the case, Ishares is a US collective investment undertaking that qualifies as a regulated investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (paragraph 10).
The Italian tax authority allows investors in a fund to claim the treaty between Italy and their own country of residence on their share of the Italian income where either: (a) their country treats the fund as tax-transparent; or (b) the fund is a mere conduit that distributes its income at least annually and the investors are taxed on it at home. The investors must also be treaty-resident (tax-exempt entities may qualify if their home country treats them as within the scope of income tax) and the beneficial owners of the income (see Resolutions 17/E of 2006 and 167/E of 2008; Circular 6/E of 2016; Ruling 17 of 2022). Such an approach is also normally granted in the context of tax settlement procedure. The Italian Supreme Court has taken the same approach (Judgment 24288 of 2019).
See in particular the decisions issued by the Italian Supreme Court no. 21454, 21475, 21480, 21481 and 21482 of 6 July 2022, as subsequently confirmed in other decisions (Nos. 11188 of 27 April 2023; 15060 of 29 May 2023; 17637, 17657, 17665, 17667 and 17670 of 20 June 2023; 20787 of 18 July 2023; and 21581, 21591, 21718 and 21720 of 20 July 2023; see also the judgments of the Rome Tax Court of First Instance Nos. 11354 and 11355 of 18 October 2022). Lower tax courts have applied the same reasoning to a US company receiving dividends from its Italian subsidiary (see Abruzzo Tax Court of Second Instance, judgment No. 93 of 17 February 2026).
Here the CJEU restates principles it set out in Nordcurrent (C‑228/24, 3 April 2025). In both judgments, the Court requires the tax authorities to look at all the relevant facts. In Neo Group, it stresses how wide this review can be: it may cover later events and transactions abroad, at any point in the chain. In Nordcurrent, the Court also made clear that a non-genuine structure is not enough on its own. The authorities must also show that its main purpose was to obtain a tax advantage, assessed in light of the overall tax effect of the structure. If the structure produces no overall tax saving, this weighs against a finding of abuse. Nordcurrent therefore acts as an important counterbalance for taxpayers against the wide scope of the tax authorities' review. It is also consistent with the guidance issued by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance on 27 February 2025 on the Italian general anti-abuse rule: the tax authorities must first establish an undue tax advantage, and where there is none, there is no abuse.
Neo Group does not say how Member States should share the right to tackle abuse when several Member State are involved. This may lead to disagreements between countries. These could be resolved through a mutual agreement procedure (MAP), either under the relevant tax treaty or under the EU Tax Dispute Resolution Directive (2017/1852). A MAP can be opened for any disagreement on how a tax treaty applies, even if there is no double taxation. If the tax authorities fail to agree, however, the Directive allows a country to refuse to move to the final, arbitration-like stage before an advisory commission where there is no double taxation. This matters for dividends and capital gains, which are often exempt in the recipient's country. The CJEU is due to decide in Maxima LT (C‑497/25) whether double taxation exists where the income is exempt in one of the two countries. In her Opinion of 22 October 2026, the Advocate General took a narrow view: there is double taxation only if tax is actually paid in both countries, so exempt income would not qualify.
The Italian tax authorities itself acknowledges that, in private equity transactions, the fund manager sets the corporate and financial structure of the investment at the outset, before the holding companies and the acquisition vehicle are incorporated, and that these decisions are usually recorded in a structure memorandum (Circular 6/E of 30 March 2016).
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