U.S. Criminal Investigations Involving Colombia’s President Reshape Corporate Risk

Since January 2025, the Trump Administration has made the disruption of transnational criminal organizations and drug cartels in Latin America a central national security priority. That effort has increasingly relied on a multifaceted enforcement toolkit—designating cartels as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), imposing sanctions on political figures and other individuals with ties to FTOs and other criminal organizations, and pursuing criminal cases against foreign government officials with alleged ties to narcotraffickers. In January 2026, this approach reached a new high‑water mark when U.S. authorities seized and criminally charged Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro for alleged narcoterrorism offenses.

Although actions targeting Venezuela have garnered significant attention, recent developments involving Colombia demonstrate that the geographic scope of U.S. enforcement is expanding. Over the past year, the Administration has issued new sanctions designations for Colombian officials and, most recently, public media reports indicate that US federal prosecutors have launched criminal investigations into President Petro’s alleged ties to drug trafficking networks. Together, these developments have added a new layer of risk and complexity for companies that operate in Colombia, creating a new imperative to reassess Colombia‑related operations through a broader compliance lens that includes sanctions, corruption, money laundering, terrorism, narcotrafficking, and other enforcement risks. 

The Petro Investigation

In October 2025, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Colombian President Gustavo Petro and members of his inner circle as specially designated nationals (SDNs) under Executive Order 14059. The action followed the Trump Administration’s September 15, 2025 determination that Colombia qualifies as a “major drug transit or major illicit drug producing” country under Section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. These actions have compounded Petro’s domestic legal and political challenges, including stalled negotiations between Colombia’s security apparatus and armed groups, ahead of a May 2026 general election.

Most recently, in March 2026, media outlets reported that there are ongoing U.S. criminal investigations into President Petro’s alleged ties to drug trafficking networks, including inquiries by federal prosecutors in Manhattan and Brooklyn. The precise scope of the ongoing U.S. criminal investigations against Petro and members of his inner circle remains unknown. At present, no public indictment has been issued. Nevertheless, an investigation into a sitting head of state inevitably raises the prospect of a spillover to other companies and individuals. As the investigations progress, US prosecutors may issue voluntary requests for documents, grand jury subpoenas, and even criminal indictments to companies and individuals with direct and indirect ties to Petro’s wide sphere of influence in the country. 

Key Areas of Elevated Risk

These developments risk legal, reputational, and commercial harm for companies and individuals that operate in the region. This reality should encourage companies to consider not just their dealings with SDN-listed persons, but also transactions with government departments and state-owned enterprises, which may have direct and indirect connections to blocked persons. In particular, US regulators and prosecutors are likely to focus heightened attention on opaque payment pathways, third-party intermediaries connected to President Petro’s network or government, and commodities or infrastructure linked to alleged trafficking networks. 

The situation in Colombia also carries broader regional implications for businesses. Venezuela is a regional example where the sudden capture and indictment of a sitting leader has given investors pause about whether to commit long-term capital into a successor government whose trajectory remains uncertain. The ongoing investigations also cast a shadow over U.S.-Colombia counternarcotics cooperation and bilateral relations. With President Petro’s term set to end in August 2026, companies must also navigate uncertainty surrounding a successor government’s willingness to cooperate with U.S. efforts to target transnational criminal organizations, drug cartels, and their supports in the region.

Practical Considerations for Companies

Given the elevated risks, companies with ties to Colombia should consider proactive steps to enhance and safeguard compliance systems, including:

(i)  Sanctions Screening and Training: Implementing robust sanctions screening processes and updated training for all parties involved in Colombia-related activities.

(ii) Mapping Government Touchpoints: Conducting thorough due diligence to map all government touchpoints, including licenses, customs, procurement, SOEs, and regulatory approvals, as well implementing heightened approval processes for government-facing expenditures.

(iii) Re-vetting Intermediaries: Scrutinizing and re-vetting all third-party intermediaries, such as customs brokers, security vendors, freight forwarders, distributors, and consultants, especially those connected to government dealings or Petro’s network.

(iv) Tightening Financial Controls: Strengthening financial controls and focusing on source-of-funds verification. Companies should prepare for correspondent banking friction as financial institutions de-risk due to increased perceived anti-money laundering risks.

(v) Updating Contracts: Reviewing and updating contracts to include robust sanctions compliance clauses, and suspensions or termination rights for sanctions, anti-money laundering, or trafficking red flags, as well as assessing existing force majeure provisions in light of new risks and consider obtaining sanctions compliance certifications where possible.

(vi) Pre-position Disclosure Decisions: Establishing internal escalation protocols in advance for identified vulnerabilities. The DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement Policy rewards voluntary self-disclosure, making it prudent to pre-position decisions regarding potential disclosures. Companies should also prepare for potential questions from the DOJ. 

Conclusion

Colombia still presents many opportunities for business and growth. However, the emergence of U.S. criminal investigations into President Petro introduces new risks. The practical challenge for companies lies in identifying and managing increased exposure created by state touchpoints, payment channels, intermediary entities, and politically exposed persons during this period of heightened scrutiny. We will continue to monitor these developments involving Colombia and the broader region over the coming months.