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  4. One Disclosure, Two Sets of Benefits: DOJ and HHS Consolidate the Pathways for Reporting Healthcare Fraud and Certain Civil Violations
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One Disclosure, Two Sets of Benefits: DOJ and HHS Consolidate the Pathways for Reporting Healthcare Fraud and Certain Civil Violations

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Oct 29 2026

On October 15, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) National Fraud Enforcement Division (Fraud Division) and the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG) announced a joint policy designed to streamline the voluntary self-disclosure of potential criminal healthcare misconduct.  Under the new framework, companies that make a qualifying voluntary self-disclosure to DOJ’s Fraud Division can receive the benefits of both DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP) and HHS-OIG’s Health Care Fraud Self-Disclosure Protocol (SDP) through a single disclosure, without submitting a separate disclosure through HHS-OIG’s portal.  

One week later, on October 22, 2026, DOJ Civil Division (Civil Division) and the Department of Health and Human Services (Office of the General Counsel, HHS-OIG, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)) (collectively, HHS) announced a complementary Healthcare False Claims Act Self-Disclosure Pilot Program (FCA SDPP) for the unified resolution of certain civil claims.  The FCA SDPP accepts voluntary self-disclosures for companies seeking a coordinated resolution of civil liability under the False Claims Act (FCA) and a limited number of HHS programs.  This pilot program is available through April 22, 2027—the six-month duration of the pilot program. 

These policies address a recurring challenge for healthcare companies.  The same conduct may create overlapping criminal, civil, and administrative exposure.  An alleged kickback arrangement, improper billing practice, or participation by an excluded individual can implicate DOJ, HHS-OIG, and other regulators simultaneously.  Historically, companies confronting such issues had to determine not only whether to disclose, but also where to disclose and whether multiple submissions were required.  

The agencies’ new policies are designed to eliminate that uncertainty for matters involving potential criminal or civil misconduct affecting one or more federal healthcare programs.  For example, the FCA SDPP provides a coordinated civil release from DOJ and HHS for qualifying disclosures.  In the criminal context, companies seeking benefits under both the CEP and SDP frameworks should direct potentially criminal healthcare misconduct to DOJ, and in particular to the Fraud Division’s Health Care Fraud Section.  Reporting only to HHS-OIG under the SDP will generally be insufficient for purposes of securing a criminal declination otherwise available under the CEP. 

The coordinated policies should be treated as separate, and neither is a comprehensive healthcare self-disclosure regime.  The criminal joint policy’s aim is narrow: aligning DOJ’s CEP and HHS-OIG’s SDP in cases involving potential federal criminal violations affecting federal healthcare programs.  The FCA SDPP addresses a separate area of risk by providing a framework for resolving certain civil False Claims Act exposure.  If submitting only pursuant to the criminal joint policy, the HHS-OIG SDP notes that HHS-OIG will coordinate with DOJ to resolve civil SDP matters, though the extent of cooperation is determined by DOJ and DOJ civil matters are not addressed.  While DOJ and HHS-OIG have indicated that disclosures may be coordinated, companies seeking the benefits of the FCA SDPP should anticipate providing any additional information required by DOJ’s Civil Division, including information necessary to satisfy the pilot program’s requirements.  As a result, companies must continue to assess civil and criminal risks independently and determine whether separate disclosure obligations or strategic disclosure considerations may arise.

These announcements follow DOJ’s continued emphasis on healthcare fraud as a significant enforcement priority and reflect DOJ’s broader effort to encourage voluntary self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation through various policy incentives. 

A Streamlined Route for Reporting Potential Misconduct

Healthcare companies frequently face situations in which a single course of conduct may present criminal liability, civil penalties, and administrative sanctions. 

The new criminal joint policy clarifies how DOJ’s CEP and HHS-OIG’s SDP operate together in those circumstances:

  • A qualifying disclosure to DOJ carries HHS-OIG SDP benefits: A company that makes a voluntary self-disclosure to DOJ’s Fraud Division that satisfies the CEP’s requirements and concerns potential criminal conduct affecting a federal healthcare program will receive the benefits available under the SDP.  No duplicate submission through the HHS-OIG portal is required.
  • The process generally does not work in reverse: A disclosure made solely through the SDP generally does not qualify as a voluntary self-disclosure under the CEP framework and ordinarily will not satisfy the disclosure requirement necessary for a declination under the CEP.  Such disclosures may nevertheless be considered as part of a company’s cooperation and remediation efforts.
  • HHS-OIG has clarified that criminal matters should be directed to DOJ: HHS-OIG simultaneously updated its SDP to make clear that the protocol is not available for criminal law violations.  Potentially criminal healthcare misconduct should be disclosed to DOJ, and criminal matters submitted through the SDP may be referred to DOJ.
  • The Health Care Fraud Section is the preferred entry point for qualifying disclosures: Companies should ordinarily direct disclosures to DOJ’s Health Care Fraud Section.  Consistent with the CEP, however, good-faith disclosures to other DOJ components may also qualify in appropriate circumstances.

Likewise, the FCA SDPP clarifies how Civil Division and HHS operate together: 

  • For the next 6 months, a qualifying disclosure to Civil Division carries HHS benefits: A company that makes a qualifying, voluntary self-disclosure to DOJ’s Civil Division can receive the benefit of a coordinated civil release from both Civil Division and HHS.  Disclosing parties need not make any other self-disclosures, such as to any HHS portal. 
  • The disclosure must have been previously unknown to the federal government: The FCA SDPP is generally available only for conduct previously unknown to the federal government.  Companies whose conduct is already known to DOJ or HHS may still receive cooperation credit, but ordinarily are not eligible for resolution under the pilot program. 

Simplified Reporting; Same Standards

The practical message is straightforward: companies seeking the benefits of unified disclosure frameworks should bring healthcare misconduct affecting federal healthcare programs to DOJ in the first instance. Although the new policies simplify the disclosure process, they do not alter the substantive conditions for obtaining favorable treatment.

As we have previously discussed, under the CEP, the most favorable outcome remains tied to voluntary self-disclosure, full cooperation, and timely and appropriate remediation.  Absent aggravating circumstances, DOJ generally will decline prosecution when those conditions are satisfied.  Even where aggravating circumstances exist, prosecutors retain discretion to recommend a declination after assessing the nature of the misconduct alongside the company’s disclosure, cooperation, and remediation efforts.

The HHS-OIG SDP addresses a different category of risk.  The protocol provides a mechanism to resolve potential liability under HHS-OIG’s Civil Monetary Penalty authorities and offers significant benefits to participating companies, including a streamlined resolution process, lower settlement multipliers than may be available in government-initiated investigations, and the possibility of resolving HHS-OIG exclusion concerns without integrity agreement obligations. 

At the same time, companies should not view disclosure as a cost-free resolution mechanism.  Under HHS-OIG’s longstanding SDP framework, settlements generally require payment of at least 1.5 times single damages, and favorable treatment remains contingent on ongoing cooperation.  In addition, the joint policy expressly notes that SDP benefits do not extend to mandatory exclusion authorities. 

The distinction is important.  The streamlined criminal policy does not create new substantive benefits.  Rather, it allows companies that make a qualifying disclosure to DOJ to access both the CEP and SDP frameworks through a single disclosure process. 

In like manner, the FCA SDPP seeks to clarify and streamline, not to create a new substantive benefit.  The protocol notes coordinated civil release and favorable financial resolution as the two benefits for disclosure under the FCA SDPP. Where before a company may have received these same benefits, they now have access to them through one single report.  The FCA SDPP offers two principal benefits: a coordinated civil release and a favorable resolution framework.  Under the coordinated release, DOJ’s Civil Division may release qualifying disclosed FCA claims, while HHS agrees not to pursue certain administrative remedies.  As announced, HHS will not require a Corporate Integrity Agreement or impose exclusion, CMS will not revoke enrollment or billing privileges, and neither CMS nor HHS will pursue civil monetary penalties arising from the disclosed conduct.  Financial resolution generally requires repayment using a multiplier ranging from 1.25 to 1.6, depending on factors such as timeliness of the disclosure, scope and duration of the conduct, senior-management involvement, and the company’s financial benefit. 

The SDP Remains Available for Excluded Civil and Administrative Matters

The updated SDP does not redirect all healthcare compliance issues to criminal prosecutors.  HHS-OIG’s SDP remains available for matters involving conduct that may violate laws giving rise to HHS-OIG’s Civil Monetary Penalty authority.  The protocol therefore continues to serve as an important mechanism for resolving appropriate civil and administrative healthcare compliance concerns.

At the same time, the SDP continues to exclude certain categories of matters.  For example, the SDP is generally unavailable for overpayments and billing errors that do not implicate potential Civil Monetary Penalty liability.  In addition, physician self-referral issues that do not involve potential Anti-Kickback Statute exposure generally remain subject to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ separate Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol rather than the SDP process.

Likewise, the FCA SDPP is only available for certain categories of matters.  The FCA SDPP states it is limited to the coordinated resolution of civil liability under the FCA and particular HHS programs: 42 C.F.R. §§ 424.535 (revocation of enrollment in the Medicare program), 1001.901 (permissive exclusion for false or improper claims), and 1001.951 (permissive exclusion based on fraud and kickbacks or other prohibited activities). 

As a result, companies must still carefully assess the nature of the underlying conduct.  The new policies clarify the disclosure path for potentially criminal matters, but determining whether a concern reflects a billing error, a civil or administrative violation, or potential criminal misconduct remains a fact-intensive legal and compliance exercise.

Key Takeaways

The new criminal policy is fundamentally a procedural clarification governing the relationship between DOJ’s CEP and HHS-OIG’s SDP for potential criminal matters affecting federal healthcare programs, but one with potentially significant consequences for healthcare companies evaluating self-disclosure decisions.  It does not, however, create a unified framework for addressing all potential civil and criminal healthcare fraud exposure.  Further, the complementary FCA SDPP leaves gaps but may still streamline reporting through the duration of the pilot program. 

  • Evaluate criminal exposure early: Internal reporting channels should escalate potentially serious concerns promptly to legal and compliance personnel.  Companies should assess disclosure strategy at the outset of an internal review, rather than waiting until the factual record is complete.
  • Do not assume that an HHS-OIG disclosure preserves DOJ disclosure credit: The joint policy expressly provides that a disclosure made solely through the SDP generally will not satisfy the CEP’s voluntary disclosure requirement.  Companies should therefore carefully assess potential criminal exposure before selecting a disclosure channel. 
  • Treat disclosure, cooperation, and remediation as a single process: A disclosure is only the first step.  Companies seeking favorable treatment should be prepared to investigate promptly, preserve relevant information, remediate misconduct, and provide meaningful cooperation to the government.
  • Consider the full range of potential consequences: Criminal liability, civil penalties, exclusion risk, settlement obligations, and compliance requirements factor into any disclosure assessment.  While a single disclosure may now unlock benefits under both the CEP and SDP frameworks, the FCA SDPP addresses separate civil and administrative exposure.
  • Update response protocols, not just reporting instructions: Compliance and legal teams should understand which matters remain appropriate for disclosure to HHS, which warrant consideration of DOJ disclosure, and when other reporting mechanisms may apply.
  • Assess potential FCA exposure separately: The unified CEP and SDP reporting mechanism may include civil claims that bring in the FCA SDPP, but companies may still be required to supplement and substantiate their reporting. 
  • Consider the timeliness of reporting: The FCA SDPP is a pilot program; companies must consider what they have already reported to the government and whether the pilot program provides advantages when considering a report. 

The October 15 joint policy reflects a coordinated effort by DOJ and HHS-OIG to reduce procedural uncertainty surrounding self-disclosure of potential criminal healthcare misconduct affecting federal healthcare programs.  The October 22 FCA SDPP reinforces this position for civil conduct while simultaneously demonstrating the government’s interest in healthcare misconduct.  Companies no longer need to navigate parallel disclosure processes to obtain the benefits available under both DOJ’s CEP and HHS-OIG’s SDP, or the Civil Division and the HHS. 

For healthcare companies, the central considerations remain largely unchanged.  The quality of the company’s response, the speed with which potential misconduct is identified and investigated, the effectiveness of remediation efforts, the assessment of civil and criminal exposure, and the choice of disclosure strategy will continue to play a significant role in shaping the ultimate outcome.

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For a collection of related previous posts and webinars, please click this link.

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Tags

regulatory frameworkinvestigationsregulatory and compliance advisorywhite-collar defense and corporate crimeanti-bribery and corruptionlife sciences

Authors

New York

Daniel Cendan

Partner
Washington, DC

Daniel Grooms

Partner
New York

Timothy Howard

Global Co-Head of Data and Technology
New York

Aidan McGirr

Associate
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